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policies. It is unlikely that all the issues in the area will be
resolved within the foreseeable future. However, it seems inappropriate for state legislatures to permit these conflicts to find
resolution at town planning board meetings where local interests
are frequently given undue weight. The balancing of public
interests and the settling of conflicts of such importance presumably
deserve the close attention of the state legislatures.

M
THE JuvENILE OFFENDER'S PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN THE

NEw YORK FAmILY COURT
Should a child, when under the jurisdiction of a state juvenile
court, be afforded the constitutional rights guaranteed an adult in
ordinary criminal proceedings, i.e., the right to counsel, the right
against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses and the
right to appeal? A recent Arizona case, Application of Gault,'
now pending before the United States Supreme Court, which is in
accord with numerous jurisdictions, has answered this question in
the negative. Several months ago, the United States Supreme
Court, in Kent v. United States, 2 declared that the District of
Columbia's waiver proceeding, which determines whether jurisdiction will be entertained by either the criminal or juvenile
court, was unconstitutional. Thus, it appears that the Court is,
for the first time,3 attempting to deal with the constitutional problems
inherent in modem-day treatment of juvenile offenders. Whether
the Court will declare many state procedures to be in violation
of due process is a matter of great speculation.
In 1894, the New York legislature amended the Penal Code
to provide that a child under the age of fourteen, charged with
a felony which was not a capital offense, might, in the discretion of
the court, be tried for a misdemeanor. 4 The charge was finally
reduced to juvenile delinquency as a matter of right,5 and, in 1922,
the children's courts were established throughout the state. 6
Since the child was not to be convicted of a crime but only
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, an entirely novel proceeding was
created. The state's relation to the child was that of parens
199 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. juris. noted, 384 U.S. 997

(1966).

2383 U.S. 541 (1966).

3 No United States Supreme Court decision has been found in this area,
nor 4does the Kent case refer to any Supreme Court case.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1894, ch. 726, § 1.
5 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1909, ch. 478, J 1.
6 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1922, ch. 547, § 3.
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patriae,7 i.e., the state acted as the parent of the child who had
been neglected and misguided during his early years. The child
was to be rehabilitated and not punished, since a child was considered more receptive to treatment than an adult.8 Many of
the procedural safeguards were relaxed in view of the fact that
an adjudication resulted in treatment rather than punishment.
However, certain due process limitations were retained. For
example, the child had to be charged with some form of juvenile
delinquency, regardless of whether the offense was of a criminal
nature, 9 and also a writ of habeas corpus was available if the
court lacked jurisdiction. 0
The New York Court of Appeals reached the constitutional
issues and construed the provisions of two different children's
court acts. In People v. Fitzgerald," a child under sixteen was
convicted under the prior Buffalo Children's Court Act on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice and on his own
confession which had been induced under threats of violence.
The Court of Appeals set aside the conviction, holding that the
charge against the child must be proved in the same manner as
if made against an adult, i.e., by competent evidence.' 2 The Court
construed the particular act as consisting of two distinct procedures:
(1) an inquiry into the circumstances relating to the proper
guardianship and care of the child, and (2) a trial upon a
specific charge with competent evidence resulting in a judgment
of conviction and the imposition of a fine.
The Fitzgerald case would seem to have made mandatory, in a
juvenile court proceeding, those constitutional safeguards afforded
to the adult offender. However, this conclusion was not reached
by the Court in People v. Lewis' 3 which involved the construction
of an entirely different statute. There the Court affirmed a conviction even though the child had not been warned of his right to
remain silent, and the judgment rested solely on his confession.
The Court distinguished Fitzgerald by stating that the statute
involved therein was of a criminal nature since it imposed criminal
sanctions and therefore required strict evidentiary rules. The Court
7 People ex rel. Converse v. Derrick, 146 Misc. 73, 77-78, 261 N.Y. Supp.
447, 452 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
8 In the Matter of Robles, 193 Misc. 870, 84 N.Y.S2d 827 (Dom. Rel.
Ct 1948).
9 People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 74, 182 N.E. 675, 676 (1932).
10 Matter of Post, 199 Misc. 1075, 107 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 280 App. Div. 268, 113 N.Y.S.2d 475 (3d Dep't 1952).
"1244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927).
n The Court was referring to N.Y. CODE CRim. Psoc §§ 395, 399. Section 395 excludes from evidence a confession that has been coerced, and also
requires proof in addition to a confession to warrant a conviction. Section
399 requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated.
23 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E 353, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 709 (1932).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 41

reasoned that the statute in Lewis was purely for the benefit of
the child and in no way imposed criminal penalties. Therefore,
there was neither a right to nor a necessity for the procedural
safeguards prescribed by the constitution and by criminal statutes.
In 1962, with the enactment of the Family Court Act, all
children's courts of the state of New York were abolished and
replaced by one tribunal, the family court.' 4 The Lewis case
which did not impose any stringent constitutional requirements
was regarded as allowing the legislature "wide discretion in
prescribing the processes of law in this area." 15 The legislature,
recognizing this fact, stated that the purpose of the new act was
to provide the child with protection consistent with due process. 16
Hence, the parens patriae concept, in effect, became outmoded and
was no longer a basis for the relaxation of procedural safeguards.
The act contains many safeguards and affords more protection
than the Children's Court Act or statutes currently in force in
many other jurisdictions. It is the purpose of this note to analyze
many of the provisions of the Family Court Act and to determine
whether they afford the juvenile the fullest protections without
limiting the courts in fulfilling and applying the underlying philosophy of the juvenile court.
Apprehension, Detention, and Right to Counsel
Apprehension and Right to Counsel
The procedure under the act for apprehending and detaining
a juvenile differs in accordance with the formal determination
sought. A child may either be adjudicated a juvenile delinquent
or a person in need of supervision (hereinafter referred to as
a PINS) .'. The former applies when a child has committed
an act which, if done by an adult, would be a crime.' 8 The latter
applies in a case in which a child has either been truant or
has committed an anti-social act which is non-criminal in nature. 9
The major purpose in differentiating between the two was to avoid,
in appropriate cases, the needless stigma of "juvenile delinquent." 20
"Juvenile delinquent" was considered a term of disapproval and
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962,
15 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Act
16 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr
17 N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT
'2

ch. 688, §§ 1, 2.
§ 711, Committee Comments (1962).
§ 711 (1962).
§ 712 (1962). This distinction is

important
throughout the entire act due to the fact that different rules will apply
depending upon the type of adjudication.
18 N.Y. FAmILY CT. Acr § 712(a) (1962).
19
See N.Y. FAmILY Cr. ACT § 712(b) (1962).
2
0 N.Y.S. JOINT LmsITIvE CommIrrrEE ON CouRT REORGANIZATION-I
THE FAMILy CouRT Acr 7 (1962) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).

NOTES

1967 ]

judges had been reluctant to make such an adjudication in the
absence of conduct violating the Penal Law. In some instances,
however, an adjudication of delinquency was rendered although
no criminal-type acts had been committed because some kind of
supervision 21
was considered necessary for the proper development
of the child.
A juvenile may be apprehended without a court order only
in those cases where an adult might similarly be arrested without
a warrant. 22 Thus, a child who will be charged with being a
PINS can never be apprehended without a court order. A police
officer who does, in fact, seize a child charged with juvenile
delinquency must notify his parents immediately and then release
the child to his parents or bring the juvenile to the family court.3
A violation of this provision may cause the invalidation of a
minor's confession.
In Matter of Addson,24 defendant, age thirteen, was charged
with being a juvenile delinquent on a petition made by a police
officer. She appeared at the police station of her own accord,
without her parents, and voluntarily confessed to the offense. The
court invalidated the confession, and indicated "that a confession
may not be obtained prior to notifying parents or relatives and
releasing the child either to them or to a Family Court." 2- However, a recent amendment provides that if it is necessary to question
the child, the police officer, after making every reasonable effort
to notify the parents, may do so for a reasonable period of time
at a place designated by the appropriate appellate division.2 6
The amendment, however, fails to provide for a warning as
to right to counsel. The Family Court Act only provides for this
warning at the commencement of a hearing.2 7 The act does not
provide for a warning at any preliminary stage such as an interrogation by police officers. Although Section 735 of the Family
Court Act does provide that statements made during a preliminary
conference are inadmissible as evidence at a fact-finding hearing
(thus apparently rendering unnecessary such a warning), it has
been held that this does not apply to statements taken by the
police.28
21 Ibi.
22

N.Y.

FAmLY

CT. Acr § 721 (1962).

23 N.Y. FAmILY CT. AcT § 724(b) (Supp. 1965).
2420 App. Div. 2d 90, 245 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1963).

For an
excellent discussion as to when a violation of § 724 will invalidate a minor's
confession,
see 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 286 (1966).
25
Matter of Addison, 20 App. Div. 2d 90, 92, 245 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (4th
Dep't
26 1963).
N.Y. FAMIY CT. Acr § 724(b) (ii) (Supp. 1965).
27 N.Y. FAmyY CT. Acr § 741 (1962).
2
8 Supra note 25.
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With the advent of Miranda v. Arizona,29 law enforcement
authorities, before questioning a criminal suspect in custody, must
warn him of his right to counsel, and when a request is made,
provide counsel. If the individual refuses counsel, an effective
waiver must be obtained before questioning may proceed. The
same dangers which existed in Miranda and which compelled the
promulgation of the rule set forth therein exist in the questioning
of children. The act as presently construed will prevent the use
of confessions obtained prior to the required statutory notification
of the child's parents. In keeping in line with the obvious intent
of the legislature to protect the child at this sensitive stage, it
should be additionally required that either the child or his parents
be advised of the infant's right to counsel. In the alternative,
Section 735 may be extended to apply to statements made to the
police, thereby excluding these statements from the fact-finding
hearing.
Detention
In several states a child may be detained for an unlimited

amount of time pending a hearing.30 Such detention has been
excused on the grounds that (1) a child may need immediate
care and (2) releasing him to his parents may be detrimental if
they have been a source of his difficulty. 31 This type of detention
has resulted in much abuse. In one year, twenty-five per cent
of the children who were "picked up" in the United States were
detained in jails.32 In several cases
the period of detention was
33
extended for one month or more.
Detention of a child is rarely desirable before an adjudication
and usually is not needed either to protect the child or to protect
the community from further harmful activity.
The New York legislature adopted a strong policy against
temporary detention pending the initiation of a family court
proceeding.3 4 Detention of a minor will depend upon the type
of determination involved. In New York, a child charged as a
PINS must be released to a parent or other person legally re-

sponsible for his care.35 When the petition seeks a determination
29 384
30

U.S. 436 (1966).
Elson, Juvenile Courts- & Die Process, in JusTIcE
95, 101 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).

33 Ibid.

2 SUSSMAN, JuvENILE DELINQUENCY 41
33 E.g., United States v. Dickerson, 271

FOR THE CHILD

(2d ed. 1959).
F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(5-6 weeks); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647, 651 (D.D.C. 1954) (6
months).
34 See REPoRT 11.
3
5N.Y. FAMIy CT. Act § 728(b) (ii) (1962).
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as to juvenile delinquency, the child must be released "unless there
is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court" or
may "do an act which if committed by an adult would be a crime." 3 6
At first glance, this rule would appear to be unfair to the child
since it gives the court broad discretion. However, similar discretion is used by the courts in the determination of bail for adult
offenders. It has been held that the eighth amendment does not
provide for the right to bail but is merely a safeguard to prevent
37
excessive bail in the instances where it is properly granted.
Therefore, by a parity of reasoning, the act's detention procedure
is consistent with constitutional requirements.
Petition to Initiate Family Court Proceedings
In order for the family court to obtain jurisdiction, a petition
must be issued setting forth the facts which bring the child
within its jurisdiction. s The petition is a less formal document
than the criminal indictment, and has been held to be adequate
if it sufficiently informs the child of the reasons for his appearance
in court.39 Although in criminal cases punishment is related to
the specific crime committed, treatment administered to the child
will primarily relate to the needs of the minor and not to the
Therefore, requiring a petition to be as
act he committed.
sufficient as an indictment would seem to be unnecessary and
wasteful. On the other hand, carelessly and inexpertly drafted
petitions could result in abusive treatment of juveniles and hinder
their attorneys in the preparation of an adequate explanation of
the child's behavior.
Although the petition does not have to enumerate in detail
the acts committed, any exercise of power over an infant should
not turn upon a single judge's estimate of the need for treatment.
Rather, it should depend on the occurrence of acts or circumstances which have been legislatively determined as sufficient reason
for judicial action. The act provides that if the proceeding is to
adjudicate one a juvenile delinquent, the petition must allege that
the infant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would
constitute a crime. 40 In order to adjudicate one a PINS, the
§ 728(b) (iii) (1962).
Carlson v. Landow, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; see Note, Judicial Discretion
in GrantingBail, 27 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 56 (1952).
38 N.Y. FAmLY CT. Acr § 731 (1962).
so Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MmN. L. REV. 547, 557
(1957).
36 N.Y. FA mY CT. Acr

37

40 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 731 (a) (1962).
In addition, the petition must
allege that the respondent was 'under sixteen when the act was committed

and that he requires supervision, treatment, or confinement.
CT. AcT § 731 (1962).

N.Y.

FAMILY
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petition must include allegations that the minor is a habitual truant,
"is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond
the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority." 41 In
addition, it must be shown that the42 juvenile has a condition which
requires the attention of the court.
In order to insure that the court will exercise its jurisdiction
only when certain prescribed acts have been committed, two separate
proceedings are provided: a fact-finding hearing, 3 and a dispositional
hearing."
In the fact-finding hearing the statute bars reference
to the reports prepared by the probation service, which contain
evidence as to the general character and background of the respondent.45 Such matters are reserved for the dispositional hearing
which determines the type of treatment to be provided. 46 Hence,
differentiating between the issues to be decided at each hearing
and separating the evidence to be introduced provides the juvenile
with the added protection that an adjudication will not result unless
certain prescribed acts have been alleged and substantiated.
Role of the Attorney
Since the family court proceeding is informal and non-adversary,
the role of the attorney is a unique one. The early view was that
the judge protects the child, thereby reducing the significance
of the attorney's participatioii f
Although this initial premise
of judicial protection has since been shown to be impractical,
several noteworthy arguments have been made on its behalf. It
is said that the lawyer will have a confused role, since the traditional
role of the attorney is essentially a partisan one.48 Since the
juvenile court proceeding is for the benefit of the child, the attorney
must assume a different role and in certain circumstances disclose
adverse evidence. More important, however, is the possibility
that the judge may be thrown into a prosecutor's state of mind
by the presence of an advocate for the child, but none against
him. A recent New York case 49 criticized the untenable position
4 N.Y. FAasnmy CT. Acr § 732(a) (1962).

The statute requires that the

petition also contain allegations that a male is under 16 and a female under
18, and that supervision or treatment is required. N.Y. FAmILY Cr. ACT

§ 732 (1962).
42 In the Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Fan. Ct.

1963).
4

3N.Y. FAMIy CT. Acr § 742 (Supp. 1965).
"N.Y. FAMItY CT. Acr § 743 (1962).
45 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 746 (Supp. 1965).

46

N.Y. FAmIY Cr. Acr § 746 (Supp. 1965).

Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment it New York: Juvenile Cases in
the New Family Court, 48 CosuC.Lu L.Q. 499, 510 (1963).
48 See Elson, supra note 30, at 103.
49 In the Matter of Lang, 44 Misc. 2d 900, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Fan. Ct.
47

1965).
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which a judge must assume. The court noted that not only
must the judge seek the facts and bear the defense, but he must
also pass upon the evidence impartially. In such circumstances,
there is no one to interview the petitioner or complaining witnesses
prior to the trial, no one to conduct the direct examination other
than the Judge, no one to cross-examine the respondent and his
witnesses other than the Judge, and no one to prepare a brief on
questions of law. . .
The present situation inevitably results in
injury to citizens, to delinquent children, and to the entire community.50
The proper solution to such a problem would not be the banishment
of all lawyers from the family court. However, since most lawyers
are totally unfamiliar with the philosophy, policy and procedure
used in the family court, the best answer would be to educate
lawyers to understand the basic aims of the court. After such
tutelage most lawyers, cognizant of their professional obligations
to assist in the supervision, rehabilitation, and treatment of the
infant, 5' would refrain from insisting that their client be afforded
the same rights as an adult-offender or that the5 2 evidentiary rules
applicable in criminal courts be strictly followed.
Another argument put forward against the admission of the
attorney to the family court is that factual issues generally are not
in dispute, since most juveniles admit their delinquency. 3 However,
a child's admission that he participated in certain activity might
create a need for a lawyer to show that the conduct admitted
was not included within the definition of juvenile delinquent or
PINS. Although the basic facts may not be in dispute, the attorney may still play an important role in the ultimate disposition,
i.e., whether treatment, supervision or confinement is necessary.
The precise development of the evidence will bear on the disposition
and can mean the difference between commitment and probation.
Also, with the attorney's assistance, probative and social reports
can be closely scrutinized to determine omissions and errors. Additional investigation by the attorney, with suggestions for treatment, would also greatly aid the court in its determination."
The Family Court Act recognizes the important role of the
attorney and explicitly declares "that counsel is often indispensable
to Id.at 905-06, 255 N.Y.S2d at 992-93.
51 McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 Mmx. L. Rmv.

843, 846 (1961).
52 Ibid.
63 Supra note 47.

64 "The 'right to be heard' when personal liberty is at stake requires the
effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile court quite as much as it does
in a criminal court." Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 669
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
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to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful
in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of
disposition." 55 In addition, at the commencement of any hearing
the child and his parent must be advised of his right to be represented by counsel, and legal aid is made available to the indigent.5
The lawyer assigned by the court is designated a "law guardian"
rather than "counsel," "attorney" or "lawyer." Such labeling indicates the intent of the legislature that the role of the lawyer be
unique. The attorney may be said to perform at least three
separate functions-that of advocate, guardian and officer of the
court. 57

Hence, the attorney cannot act merely as an advocate,

but must play a responsible part in order to aid the court in its
attempt to protect and rehabilitate the child.
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
There have been some state court decisions which have
refused to recognize the privilege against self-incrimination in
juvenile proceedings. 58 Justification for this denial is supported
not merely on the ground that the proceeding is non-criminal, but
also because the hearing is part of the treatment process which
could not function if the child were advised that he need not
talk to anyone.5 9 Due to the fact that the hearing is non-accusatory
and is protective in nature, one may also argue that the need
for this privilege is unwarranted.
However, the better rule should permit the child to invoke
-the privilege. The fact is that a child incriminates himself when
his responses expose him to incarceration and loss of liberty through
an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. In a California case 60
a child was committed to a detention home for refusing to answer
questions. The court directed that he be released under a writ
of habeas corpus, stating:
it would have been strange indeed if the Legislature had sought to
visit a minor with the loss of his natural parents' society, guidance,
and governance merely because . . . he had the temerity to invoke
the protection of a constitutional guaranty .... C1

55 N.Y. FAmy CT.Acr

N.Y.

§ 241 (1962).

FAMILY CT.Acr

§ 741 (1962).
57 See Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors It The
New
Family Court, 12 BUFYALO L. REv. 501, 506-08 (1963).
58
E.g, In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 1205, 183 P.2d 282 (1947); In re
56

Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).

59 Supra note 39, at 560-61.
6o Ex parle Tabbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (Dist. Ct App. 1920).

61Id. at 761, 189 Pac. at 807.
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The Family Court Act recognizes the privilege against selfincrimination, and before any hearing the 62court is obligated to
advise the child of his right to remain silent.
The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial
63
Generally, the juvenile has not been entitled to a public trial.
Although such a trial would operate as a check against possible
abuses on the part of the family court, publicity would only serve
to damage the child's reputation. It is felt that the goals of informing the community and protecting the youth cannot be simultaneously pursued, since any disclosures regarding the identity
of a child, the nature of his behavior, and the like would be
nullifying the potential benefits the child may receive from the
family court proceedings.
The act provides that the general public may be excluded
from any hearing. Only those persons who have a direct interest
in the case and representatives of authorized agencies have a right
to be present.6 However, it is suggested that the judge should,
in his discretion, allow certain members of the public to be
present.
Perhaps selected members of the press should be
admitted. In England, the press is given the opportunity to
attend a proceeding but prohibited from mentioning
the name of
65
the minor or any other identifying information.
The right to a speedy trial has been denied on the ground
that the hearing is non-criminal.5
Nevertheless, the reasons for
a speedy trial in a criminal action should apply similarly to a
juvenile proceeding. The threat of loss of liberty should not
indefinitely hang over the child's head. Also the possibility of
losing witnesses who might aid in the child's defense is as real
in juvenile proceedings as in criminal actions. Although the
act provides that a fact-finding hearing must be commenced within
three days after the filing of a petition in the case of a child detained by the authorities, 67 no such provision is made for a child
released in his parents' custody. It would seem that similar
treatment should be afforded to these juveniles as well.
Rights to Appeal and to a Statement of Findings
That the right to appeal and the right to a statement of findings
are very much dependent upon each other is demonstrated by
2

63

N.Y. FAmiLY CT. AcT § 741(a) (1962).
SUSSMAN, Juvunnln Dsin~tm icy 32 (2d ed. 1959).

N.Y. FAmiLY CT. Acr § 741(b) (1962).
I' Henriques, Children's Courts in England,
295 6 6(1946-47).
6

I

37 J. Caiff. L., C

re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954).

07 N.Y. FAmiLy CT. Acr § 747 (Supp. 1965).

.

& P. S.
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Application of Gault,8 now pending before the United States
Supreme Court. There, the child's parents are seeking a writ
of habeas corpus to secure the release of their minor son who
had been committed to the state industrial school. The parents
allege that the state's juvenile procedure is unconstitutional because the statute failed to provide for a transcript of the hearing
or a statement of findings. The Arizona court held that there
was no right to appeal from a juvenile court order. Countering
the contention that due process was denied because there was no
record kept of the findings of fact upon which the conclusion
of delinquency was based, the court stated that:
the purpose of a transcript, in some instances, is to support an appeal.
But there is no right to an appeal. Furthermore, the evidence adduced at
a juvenile hearing is of a confidential nature because it is inadmissible
69
in other courts ....
Here, the only means of "appeal" afforded to the respondent
was through a writ of habeas corpus. This writ is an extraordinary one and the scope of review it offers cannot be compared
with that available under normal appellate procedures. 7° Surely
the petitioner, in danger of being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent,
is entitled to some of the protection against errors of law and
fact accorded his adult equivalent. Without the existence of a
court record, appellate review, even if granted, could not be
exercised properly.
Under the Family Court Act, the New York court is required,
when the allegations of a petition are established, to state the
grounds for the finding. 71 In addition, an appeal may be taken
as of right from any order of disposition and, in the discretion
of the appellate division, from any other order.7 2 In conformity
with the informal procedures of the family court, however,
no printed case or brief is required on appeal. 73 Also, where appropriate, the provisions of the New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules apply to this appellate procedure. 74 Thus, under the
act, the minor is afforded an adequate form of appellate review.

68 99 Ariz. 180, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), prob. juris. mwted, 384 U.S. 997

(1966).
69 Id. at 192, 407 P.2d at 768.
70 See generally 25 Am. JTJR. Habeas Corpus § 26 (1940).
71 N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 752 (1962).
72 N.Y. FAMILy CT. AcT §§ 1011, 1012 (1962).
73 N.Y. FAmIY CT. Acr § 1016 (1962).
74 N.Y. FAMiLY CT.

Acr a 1018 (1962).
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Evidence

The type of evidence that is to be presented is an important
factor in determining the constitutional 7 validity
of a juvenile pro5
ceeding. According to People v. Lewis,
hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, trends of hostile neighborhood
feeling, the hopes and fears of social workers, are all sources of error
and have no more place in Children's Courts than in any other
court.

70

However, in other jurisdictions the hearsay evidence rule has not
been as carefully transposed to juvenile courts. For example,
in In re Holmes 77 the court admitted certain testimony substantiating
a charge that a child was implicated in the armed robbery of a
church. A detective testified as to the substance of a confession,
subsequently repudiated, made by an accomplice. Although the
findings of delinquency were not based solely on this testimony,
the danger in permitting the introduction of this type of evidence
became apparent.
The court stated that while a finding must
be based on sufficient competent evidence, the court may avoid many
of the legalistic features of the rules of evidence customarily
applicable to other judicial hearings.
The Family Court Act provides that in a fact-finding hearing
only evidence that is competent, material and relevant may be
admitted.78 However, in a dispositional hearing, evidence to be
admissable need only be material and relevant.79 The legislature
probably intended to make clear that the hearsay rule, although
not applicable to exclude certain evidence in a dispositional
hearing, would exclude similar evidence in a fact-finding hearing. 0
This distinction is made in recognition of the importance of
sociological reports in the ultimate determination of what controls
need to be placed on the child. The use of medical, psychiatric,
psychological and background facts is the essence of the juvenile
court therapy."' These reports cannot be used in other than the
dispositional hearing. A fact-finding hearing, on the other hand,
is only concerned with whether certain acts have been committed
and the judge should not be influenced, at this point, with reports
noting the respondent's character.
75260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932).
76 Id. at 178, 183 N.E. at 355.
77 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
78 N.Y. FAmILY CT. Acr § 744(a) (Supp. 1965).
79 N.Y. FAsILY CT. Acr § 745 (a) (1962).
80 Paulsen, The New York Family Court, 12 BUF7ALO L. REv. 420, 432
(1963).
81 Ibid.
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The act provides that such "therapeutic" reports shall be
deemed confidential information which the court, in a proper case,
may withhold from counsel and other interested parties.8 2 Two
arguments support the treatment of these reports as confidential:
(1) the rule of total confidentiality is necessary to protect sources
of information, and (2) the reports contain data that may3
damage the family relationship if disclosed to the parties.
Disclosure of these reports to a family, without further information, might create hostilities between the child and his parents
or between the parents themselves, and hinder any chance for
improved relations in the future. The legislature, concerned with
the possible effect of disclosure on family relationships, gave the
judge authority to withhold medical data and psychiatric diagnoses
when he believes that disclosure would be harmful.8 4 However,
this provision should not allow the judge to prevent counsel
from inspecting these reports. The policy for non-disclosure would
appear not to be applicable to the attorney when he is admonished
that certain information should not be disclosed to his client.
Waiver of Family Court's Jurisdiction
In most jurisdictions there are provisions which deal with the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. Waiver will usually depend
upon the age of the respondent and the nature of the offense
committed. 5 In Kent v. United States, the Court determined
the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's waiver proceeding. The provision read:
If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense
which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child
charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable
by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation,
waive jurisdiction and order such child held for trial under the regular
procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense
if committed by an adult. .. .r
Defendant requested a hearing on the question of waiver, and
access to the Social Service file. No hearing was had and the
judge, without conferring with defendant or his counsel, waived
jurisdiction. He made no findings nor did he recite any reasons
for the waiver. Defendant was then indicted, stood trial and
82 N.Y. FAmILY CT.
83
REPORT 10.
84 Ibid.
85 SUssMAN, op. cit.

Acr § 746(b) (Supp. 1965).

supra note 63, at 26.
88 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
87D.C. CoDE § 11-914 (1961).
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was found guilty. Defendant urged that the waiver proceeding
was a violation of due process and also urged that the procedures
concerning his prior detention and interrogation were unlawful and
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court refused to examine the question of the
District of Columbia Act as a whole. However, it did declare
the waiver proceeding defective on statutory and constitutional
grounds. The Court, through Mr. Justice Fortas, stated:
[W]e conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner
was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social
records . . . and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's
decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read
in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process
and the assistance of counsel.P
The present New York Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that in cases in which a child who is fifteen commits an act
which, if done by an adult, would be a crime punishable by
death or life imprisonment, jurisdiction may be waived by the
criminal courts and vested in the family court.8 9 The provision
does not encompass all felonious acts as did the statute involved in
Kent, and the determination of waiver is not to be decided by
the family court but in the regular criminal courts. The procedure
involves an indictment against the juvenile and, thereafter, upon
recommendation to the court by the grand jury, the district attorney,
or upon the court's own motion, an investigation is granted to
determine whether the proceedings should be removed to the
family court. Should the court determine, after examination,
investigation and questioning, that the ends of justice, the best
interests of the state, and the welfare of the child would be served
by removal, the indictment is dismissed, no further action is
taken on the indictment, and the case is transferred to the family
court. 90 It should be emphasized that the defendant has no right
to an investigation absent a specific recommendation by the parties
indicated above.9 ' Note that
the statute neither requires a hearing
9 2
nor a statement of findings.

88

Supra note 86, at 557.

8 N.Y. COnE CRIM. PROC. § 312-c(c) (1948).

90
See ibid.
9

'Two cases have held that a denial of defendant's own motion for
removal to the family court is not appealable. People v. Jolls, 17 App. Div.
2d 1031, 235 N.Y.S.2d 456 (4th Dep't 1962) (memorandum opinion);
People
v. Lubchuk, 218 N.Y.S2d 348 (Queens County Ct 1961).
92
N.Y. CoDE CRIx. PRoc. § 312-c(a) (1948) provides that "the defendant
be investigated for the purpose of determining whether the court shall order
the action removed."
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Any discussion as to the constitutionality of New York's
present "removal" procedure would only be academic due to the
enactment of the Revised Penal Law.9 3 Section 30 states unequivocally that "a person less than sixteen years old is not
criminally responsible for conduct." The legislature felt that retention of existing law was illogical since "if a child of fifteen
is not deemed sufficiently mature to be responsible for robbery,
burglary or assault, he can hardly be deemed mature enough
to be responsible for murder or kidnapping." 04

Conclusion
On the basis of the above analysis of the principal provisions
of New York State's Family Court Act, one may justifiably
conclude that the juvenile is generally afforded the protections of
due process of law. This note has emphasized those provisions
which protect the minor in various circumstances. For example,
a child cannot be taken into custody without a court order unless
under similar circumstances the arrest of an adult would be legal.
The child is provided with two hearings, one to determine
whether the child is a juvenile delinquent or a PINS, and the
other to determine his treatment. Most significantly, a child must
be advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to be
represented by counsel at a hearing.
The Gault case, if decided for the defendant, will have little
effect on New York's legislation. The errors alleged therein
which include (1) a denial of the right to counsel, (2) a denial
of the right to appeal, (3) the failure to give proper notice
of the charge, and (4) the reliance upon unsworn hearsay testimony
could not arise under the Family Court Act.
Although New York's statute affords a more liberal approach
than that of many other jurisdictions, its provisions may be
deficient in certain respects. For example, the principles of
recent Supreme Court decisions on right to counsel may someday affect the section providing for right to counsel before a
hearing. The question is whether the child must be informed
of his right to counsel at the moment he is taken into custody.
In addition, do the police have a right to question the child, or is
his immediate release into the custody of his parents required
by due process?
The act places the release of sociological reports in the court's
discretion. Should the child have a right to inspect these documents? As was stated before, these reports are essential for the
final disposition. Counsel should at least be provided with this
9 N.Y. REv. PF.N. LAW (effective 9-1-67).

9 Commission Staff Comments, N.Y. REv. PEN. LAW art 30 (1965).
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evidence as a matter of right in order to correct any omissions
or misstatements.
Another question which presents itself is whether the child
should have a right to choose a public hearing. A statute could
be drafted to admit members of the press, if the child so chooses,
as long as his name is not reported.
These and other questions as to the validity of the Family
Court Act must await the United States Supreme Court's determination concerning due process in the realm of juvenile
law. It is recommended, during the interim, that the provisions
of the Family Court Act be closely scrutinized by the courts to
determine whether they provide not only for the rehabilitation
of the juvenile offender, but also protect his rights in accordance
with the basic requirements of due process of law.

X
MANUFACTURER'S STRICT TORT LIABILITY TO CONSUMERS FOR

EcoNo IC Loss
As American courts become increasingly aware of the need
for protecting consumers from defective goods, the law of products
liability correspondingly develops at a rapid and fascinating pace.
Privity of contract, fault as the basis of liability, and other classical
common-law concepts as prerequisites for liability are becoming
antiquated or radically modified. Virtually every state holds the
manufacturer liable to the consumer for negligence in the production
of products when it ultimately results in physical injury.' Indeed,
a few courts have held manufacturers liable for property damage
where no risk of personal injury was present, basing recovery
on express representations made directly to the consumer by the
manufacturer.2 However, absent the risk of personal injury or
express representations, attempts to expand the law of products
liability to encompass the economic loss of subpurchasers have met
great resistance.
Plaintiffs seeking to recover in negligence actions by invoking
traditional products liability theories have generally been denied
recovery when the product has not threatened or caused physical

I PRosSER, ToRTs § 96 (3d ed. 1964). Various theories, including warranty and strict liability in tort, have been used to hold manufacturers liable
when a defect in a product causes personal injuries. See generally Prosser,
The Assault Upom the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Cotwumer), 69 YAIZ
LJ. 21099 (1960).

E.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).

